Wednesday 12 September 2012

'Margin of terror' and public opinion polling in Zimbabwe



The results of the survey by the Mass Public Opinion Institute and Freedom House, Change and ‘New’ Politics in Zimbabwe, make for interesting reading. The findings of the opinion poll that involved nearly 1200 randomly selected Zimbabweans of voting age has generated animated debate both internally and externally.  This is hardly surprising. Any study that gives the world a rare glimpse into Zimbabwe’s complex political maze is greeted with fever. The Zimbabwean crisis has dominated world headlines for too long. Many continue to wonder what it will take to see change in a country that has been dominated by one man since independence in 1980.

The study is even more interesting in the context of an awkward coalition government that has defied the odds to survive three years of groin kicking acrimony between ZANU (PF) and MDC. Predictably what has dominated the news media and political chat is the survey’s finding that parliamentary support for the MDC has declined from 38% in 2010 to 20% in 2012, while that for ZANU (PF) has increased from 17% to 31% over the same period.  Acres of media space have been devoted to analyzing this statistic alone and unfortunately this has precluded a sober analysis of other variables of the study, which to me tell a different, but equally interesting story.

Paradoxically, ZANU (PF) propaganda chiefs have embraced the findings of the survey. A day after its official release The Herald newspaper, one of the party’s propaganda mouthpieces, ran a front page story on the survey, something that I never experienced in my several years as a pollster at the Mass Public Opinion Institute. This is notwithstanding the fact that the front-page coverage was followed by a muted attack of Freedom House as a ‘rightwing regime change’ agent by the same paper a few days later.

Reading through the various news articles and commentaries, it is clear that the results of the survey have meant different things to different people, even within the same political parties. On the one hand rabid ZANU (PF) defenders and MDC bashers have celebrated the results of the survey as marking the end of the MDC and the return to ZANU (PF)’s one-party dominance of Zimbabwean politics.  Sober supporters of the ZANU (PF) have read the statistics to mean that perhaps the MDC is losing its luster, thanks to corruption in MDC-run councils, absence of a sound ideological base and the disintegration of cohesion in the party. ZANU (PF) political strategists are quietly wondering whether the indigenisation and empowerment rhetoric has struck a chord with the Zimbabwean electorate.

On the other hand rabid MDC defenders and ZANU (PF) bashers have dismissed the survey findings and have wondered loudly “what has ZANU (PF) done that it would gain the support of Zimbabweans?’ The sober ones have questioned the veracity of the survey on the basis of the possibility of sampling errors given the dearth of reliable population figures on Zimbabwe. MDC political strategists are quietly wondering how the positive change that the inclusive government has brought could translate into a decline in its support and an increase in ZANU (PF)’s popularity ratings.

I fear that all of these analyses have missed one critical point, which invariably influences public opinion survey data in Zimbabwe. I argue that fear has become ingrained in the DNA of our political culture because of the preponderance of violence in our society and that the fear factor is paramount in explaining the findings of the survey.

More than 60% of MDC supporters interviewed said they had experienced threats, intimidation and harassment. Ominously, 66% of these said they had witnessed someone else being killed or injured. But this fear also transcends political boundaries as evidenced by the 32% of ZANU (PF) supporters that said they had experienced intimidation, threats and harassment. I am not sure if the researchers asked these ZANU (PF) supporters who had intimidated, harassed and threatened them. If ‘Oparation Makavhotera papi” is anything to go by, one would suspect that their own party members could have been the perpetrators. The orgy of violence in 2008 did not spare ZANU (PF) strongholds as they were punished for not having done enough to stop Morgan Tsvangirai from winning. Interestingly, about four in ten of ZANU (PF) supporters said they had witnessed someone else being killed or injured.  Again I am not sure if the researchers probed further to find who the perpetrators were.  

The most telling indicator of the fear factor is that close to half of the respondents did not want to openly declare their political affiliation. I disagree with the assertion that these are undecided voters that could go either way. I argue that Zimbabwean society is so polarised that there is no room for electoral fence sitters. These voters are decided but they are afraid of coming out. My experience of analyzing public opinion data from Zimbabwe since 2000 is that because of fear, a significant percentage of survey respondents choose not to declare their positions on politically sensitive issues, including their electoral choices. In most cases these are MDC supporters who fear a backlash. ZANU (PF) supporters hardly hide their support for their party because in most cases there are no consequences. I would therefore surmise that a majority of the 47% undeclared respondents belongs to the MDC.

While I agree that there is discernible disillusionment with the MDC’s record in the inclusive government, I disagree that this has translated into a mass exodus of its supporters to ZANU (PF), as some analysts of the survey have claimed. The problem is that the MDC is suffering from the effects of a crisis of expectation. Because of widespread disenchantment with ZANU (PF) and a collapsed economy, many Zimbabweans hoped that the MDC’s entry into the government in 2009 would make their lives better.

Without a doubt the MDC’s entry into government brought a modicum of political, economic and social stability. The survey finds out that levels of food deprivation have increasingly gone down since 2009 when 85% of respondents in a similar survey said they had gone without. By 2010 the figure had gone down to 50% and now stands at 31%. The same downward trend is recorded for shortage of clean water (49 43 and 42%), shortage of modern medicines (80 65 and 37%) and cash income (94, 91, 79%). Yet more Zimbabweans said they trusted ZANU (PF) (52%) than the MDC (39%). For me the explanation for this is that a majority of the respondents felt free to express their views on issues to do with improvements in their livelihoods but could not freely express their trust in the MDC for fear of reprisal.

While the party did a good job of bringing stability to a bartered economy, the disproportionate amount of executive power that the GPA gave to Mugabe and ZANU (PF) precluded if from fully deploying its ideas and programmes to put Zimbabwe back on a firm path to recovery and growth. This is because senior bureaucrats including permanent secretaries are aligned to ZANU (PF) and their brief since 2009 has been to set up MDC ministers for failure. ZANU (PF) is happy for the inclusive government to fail because they fear that its successes would be attributed to the MDC. 

Admittedly he MDC needs to do more in communicating this to the Zimbabwean public. At any rate Zimbabweans are aware of where real power lies in this inclusive government. And they know how that power has been abused to deny them a better life as ZANU (PF) has blocked progress on critical national processes. The constitution making exercise is a telling example. In a 2010 survey by the same organisations for instance, more than seven out of ten of respondents polled said real power resided with Mugabe.

In the final analysis it is imperative to critically look at the survey data and situate it in the current political context. Zimbabwean society is brutalized and fearful. My conclusion is that it is the ‘margin of terror’ rather than the margin of error that we should be debating.