Arthur Mutambara: A dream deferred or a dream defeated?

That Arthur Mutambara’s political life is hanging on a thread is indisputable. In fact his foray into politics has always been controversial and dramatic from the start. Plucked out of political obscurity to head the smaller faction of the MDC after the October 2005 split, Mutambara entered the fray as an enigmatic figure. Boasting an academic CV that was the envy of many in a country where academic achievement is highly regarded, Mutambara’s entry into politics was greeted with mixed feelings. While some lauded him as the political messiah that Zimbabwe had been waiting for, others were dismissive of him, arguing that academic achievement was not synonymous with good leadership.

Many Zimbabweans, weary of Robert Mugabe’s tenacious stranglehold on power, must have wondered how how a robotics professor who had been out of the country for decades could mount a serious political challenge to the foxy Mugabe. Die-hard Morgan Tsvangirai supporters derided Mutambara as a political novice who had no right to claim the coveted number one opposition leader position in Zimbabwean politics. They felt Tsvangirai had been in the trenches for too long, having destroyed ZANU (PF)’s electoral hegemony at the 2000 general elections. That Mutambara had heroically led student demonstrations that provided an early test to Mugabe’s political tenacity in the late 80s did not matter to Tsvangirai’s adherents. Some extremists in that camp even labeled him a ZANU (PF) hired gun being used as a proxy by Welshman Ncube.

How Mutambara became the number one choice for the smaller MDC faction is is not clear. It was widely speculated at the time that he had entered the fray as a reluctant leader but the trappings of power and political leadership had morphed him into an ambitious political gladiator. Party insiders say Welshman Ncube, who had led the revolt against Tsvangirai, and was the chief architect of what was to become known as the Mutambara faction, had not anticipated Mutambara’s about-turn. Ncube had hoped that Mutambara would be his political lap dog that would warm up the seat for his eventual takeover. His master plan was carefully designed to achieve two objectives. The first was to mask his real political ambition, to be the leader of the party and eventually the country. He realized that a Zimbabwean electorate that was skeptical of his political maneuvers would accuse of being an ambitious boardroom schemer who had attempted a palace coup to dislodge Tsvangirai from the leadership of the party. Moreover his role in the Ari Ben Menashe scandal that almost destroyed Tsvangirai’s political career had always been questionable. To assume leadership of the party at that juncture would have exposed his hunger for power. The second objective was to deflate the tribal outlook of the party by having Mutambara, a Shona as its head. His calculation was that a majority of the political heavyweights that had thrown their weight behind him were from Matebeleland and they would be viewed as an Ndebele outfit (exhibit A: Welshman Ncube himself, Gibson Sibanda, Fletcher Dulini Ncube, Paul Themba Nyathi, among others). Tribe is a critical variable in Zimbabwean politics.

Whether or not Mutambara could read Ncube’s mind is in the realm of conjecture. What became immediately clear was that Mutambara’s political branding would be problematic. Prone to delusions of grandeur and a ‘big ideas’ approach to politics, influenced by American politics (he spent several years in the US), Mutambara quickly realized that Tsvangirai would always overshadow him. Having honed his political skills from humble beginnings as a modestly educated mining artisan who had risen through the ranks of trade unionism to become a leader of an opposition party, Tsvangirai had become the symbol of resistance to Mugabe and ZANU (PF)’s hegemony. Mutambara correctly predicted that it would be a Herculean task to knock Tsvangirai off his perch. But he also could that ZANU (PF) had succeeded in portraying the MDC as a puppet of the West and as a result the MDC had always struggled with its branding as a genuinely African political party. Mutambara reasoned that he could occupy the space between Tsvangirai and Mugabe by advocating for a democratic political dispensation under the rubric of Pan-Africanism. This was obviously a mammoth task given Tsvangirai’s foothold on opposition politics and Mugabe’s impeccable liberation credentials and Pan African appeal. Therein lay the problem for Mutambara and that marked the beginning of his schizophrenic political branding.

The confusion was detectable from the start. In his maiden political speech, Mutambara confused many when he proclaimed himself the ‘anti-senate president of the pro-senate faction’. Ncube must have cringed in his chair wondering if he had hired the right guy for the job. On paper the October 2005 split had been caused by disagreement on whether or not to participate in senate elections, although in reality it was precipitated by personality clashes between Tsvangirai and Ncube. This was to mark the beginning of Mutambara’s quest for self-identity and a desperate desire to shake off the ‘Ncube lap dog’ tag.

The problem for Mutambara was that Zimbabwe is a highly polarized political society. It is difficult to criticize Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC and not be labeled as ZANU (PF). The reverse is true. The more Mutambara tried to project a Pan-Africanist persona by recognizing Mugabe as a liberation icon for instance, the more he was branded a ZANU (PF) politico. The more he tried to upstage Tsvangirai by questioning his intellect and judgment, the more he sounded like a pompous and condescending leader who was out of touch with reality. Zimbabweans generally highly regard the educated class but they frown upon self-importance and pomposity. Mutambara’s description of Tsvangirai as ‘an intellectual midget’ struck the wrong code with an electorate that is willing to turn a blind eye to Tsvangirai’s modest education in search of a democratic breakthrough.

While Mutambara was struggling with his ideological positioning, Ncube had other ideas. Having given Mutambara enough rope to hang himself by acting like Mugabe’s poodle, he calculated that Mutamabara’s impromptu outbursts must have caused some ructions among party faithfuls. He set out to destroy Mutambara by accusing him disregarding party policies and pushing a Mugabe agenda, charges that could easily stick. Of course Ncube had calculated that the seat was warm enough for him to take over. Always the boardroom master tactician that he is, he used his position as Secretary General to go around the country restructuring the provincial structures to ensure that his henchmen were in positions of authority. By the time the January 2011 elective congress was held, Mutambara could see that he was finished. Fearing an embarrassing defeat, he did not seek re-election and as a result Ncube was elected unopposed. Bruised and battered, Mutambara endorsed Ncube’s leadership, only to make an about turn a few days later, dismissing the congress as farce. This was followed by a hubbub of accusations and counter-accusations, court actions and counter-actions.

A few weeks ago the Bulawayo High Court made a ruling that confirmed Welshman Ncube as the legitimate leader of the faction. Mutambara has appealed the ruling but this seems like a desperate act to buy time in order to hang on to the job of Deputy Prime Minister. His political options are very limited. He can either join ZANU (PF) or form his own political party. Either way his political career seems doomed. Could this be a dream deferred or a dream defeated? Only time will tell.